

All Recommendations

Thursday, October 04, 2012 8:06:09 AM

Record #	ABU	Unit	I/R	Item Nbr	Additional Consideration (Recommendation)	ABU Proposal	Resolution	Verifier Comments	Verifier Name	Verified On	Due Date	RR	SOE	Assigned To	Status
17532	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.3.1.1	1. Issue discussed was identification of minor errors on P&IDs. Consider updating P&IDs per PHA redlines. Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.	Consider updating P&IDs per PHA redlines.					9/26/2013			Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned
17533	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.1.1	2. Issue discussed was the previous PHA recommendation #16471. The hazard noted by the previous PHA team was resolved, but the current PHA team recognized an additional hazard that should be addressed. Issue discussed was the gauge glass on V-244 is in H2S and ammonia service which may be subject to breakage from mechanical damage leading to potential personnel exposure/injury. Consider reviewing standards for installation of gauge glasses on vessels in H2S and ammonia service and replace if indicated.	Declined. Current installation meets RI-601 for new construction standards.					9/26/2013	8	S	Guttchen, Rich	Unassigned

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17534	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.2.1	3. Issue discussed was that the completion of previous PHA Recommendation #16455 may not have resolved issue identified by the PHA team. Issue discussed was the lack of pipe classification designations on some lines on P&IDs. In conjunction with piping spec break review, consider adding pipe classification designations on P&IDs where needed. (PSI issue only) Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.	In conjunction with piping spec break review, consider adding pipe classification designations on P&IDs where needed.					9/26/2013			Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned
17535	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.3.1	4. Issue discussed was that the completion of previous PHA Recommendation #16456 may not have resolved issue identified by the PHA team. Consider updating P&ID D-320358 to show that E-230 is abandoned in place and that the other out-of-service equipment has been removed from the plant. (PSI issue only) Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.	Consider updating P&ID D-320358 to show that E-230 is abandoned in place and that the other out-of-service equipment has been removed from the plant.					9/26/2013			Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned

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17536	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.4.1	5. Issue discussed was that the completion of previous PHA Recommendation #16458 may not have resolved issue identified by the PHA team.	Consider reviewing 57TV200 piping and update P&ID D-320356-18 to match actual configuration in field.					9/26/2013			Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned
					Consider reviewing 57TV200 piping and update P&ID D-320356-18 to match actual configuration in field. (PSI issue only)										
					Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.										
17537	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.5.1	6. Issue discussed was that the completion of previous PHA Recommendation #16459 may not have resolved issue identified by the PHA team.	Consider re-setting PSVs FC-217 and FC-208 to 65 PSIG and update PEIS database and P&ID as indicated. PSV data sheet and P&ID should show the same set pressures.					9/26/2013	8	A	Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned
					PSV data sheet and P&ID D-320356-18 show E-200A/B cooling water thermal relief PSVs are set at 75 psig and the design pressure of the exchanger tube bundle is 65 psig. Overpressure of the tube bundle could result in a leak of DEA into the cooling water.										
					Consider confirming settings for PSVs FC-217 and FC-208 and update PEIS database and P&ID as indicated. Reset PSV set points if appropriate. PSV data sheet and P&ID should show the same set pressures.										

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17538	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.6.1	7. Issue discussed was that the completion of previous PHA Recommendation #16464 may not have resolved issue identified by the PHA team.	Consider re-setting PSV FC-5033 to 65 PSIG and update PEIS database and P&ID as indicated. PSV data sheet and P&ID should show the same set pressures.					9/26/2013	8	A	Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned
					PSV data sheet and P&ID D-320358-14 show E-223 cooling water thermal relief PSV is set at 75 psig and the design pressure of the exchanger tube bundle is 65 psig. Overpressure of the tube bundle could result in a leak of DEA into the cooling water.										
					Consider confirming setting for PSV FC-5033 and update PSV data sheet and P&ID as indicated. Reset PSV set points if appropriate. PSV data sheet and P&ID should show the same set pressures.										
17539	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.8.7.1	8. Issue discussed was that the completion of previous PHA Recommendation #16452 may not have resolved issue identified by the PHA team.	#3H2S is cognizant of issue, procedure calls for steamout for startup. Take back to team for further review (clarity of recommendation and risk ranking).					9/26/2013	6	S		Unassigned
					Issue discussed was that Minimum Pressurizing Temperatures may not well communicated to operating personnel in #3 H2S plant. Improper management of minimum pressurizing temperatures could result in brittle fracture of equipment, loss of containment and personnel exposure/injury.										
					Consider adding a Brittle Fracture item to the Potential Unit Hazards List FCCT011J in the FCC EOM discussing the issue of Minimum Pressurizing Temperatures for both hydrotesting and startup situations.										

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17540	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.9.1.1	9. (BIN Vulnerabilities List issue)	Consider checking with Inspection to confirm that CUI issues are being addressed in the Sour Water Concentrator.					9/26/2013	7	S	Wadkins, Tim I.	Unassigned
					Issue discussed was that the Sour Water Concentrator is not run continuously and has some insulated lines which could lead to Corrosion Under Insulation (CUI) and personnel exposure/injury.										
					Consider checking with Inspection to confirm that CUI issues are being addressed in the Sour Water Concentrator.										
17541	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.9.1.2	10. (BIN Vulnerabilities List issue)	Consider surveying the pipe to confirm that there has not been any subsidence resulting in low points in the acid gas piping from #3 H2S to the SRU Bullpen. Inspect any low points identified and implement a mitigation plan if necessary.					9/26/2013	3	S	Materne, Mark R.	Unassigned
					Issue discussed was that the acid gas piping should slope from high point at #3H2S Plant to SRU Bullpen to prevent corrosion due to liquid pooling in the bottom of the pipe which could result in loss of containment and personnel exposure/injury. The acid gas line is routed near the North Yard Maintenance office building where five or more people are frequently present.										
					Consider surveying the pipe supports to confirm that there has not been any subsidence resulting in low points in the acid gas piping from #3 H2S to the SRU Bullpen.										
17542	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.9.2.1	11. (BIN Vulnerabilities List issue)	Consider getting the current inspection plan for sour gas piping and verify that any repairs and upgrade recommendations have been implemented or have plans in place to implement.					9/26/2013	6	S	Wadkins, Tim I.	Unassigned
					Issue discussed was that the sour gas piping in #3H2S Plant may contain ammonia leading to potential corrosion which could result in loss of containment and personnel exposure/injury.										
					Consider getting input from Inspection on any metallurgy upgrades and the current inspection plan for sour gas piping.										

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17543	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.9.3.1 12.	(BIN Vulnerabilities List issue)	Consider confirming with CFD that normal vessel entry permits require checking for SO2 when opening vessels in #3H2S Plant for entry as an indicator of pyrophoric material.					9/26/2013	9	S	Lally, Bruce W.	Unassigned
					Issue discussed was the potential for pyrophoric materials in #3H2S Plant.										
					Chemical cleaning generally removes all pyrophoric material prior to opening equipment.										
					Consider confirming with CFD that normal vessel entry permits require checking for SO2 when opening vessels for entry as an indicator of pyrophoric material.										
17544	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.9.4.1 13.	(BIN Vulnerabilities List issue)	Consider reviewing the current inspection plans to confirm that the area opposite inlet nozzle is thoroughly inspected and determine if any metalurgy upgrades C-200 are necessary.					9/26/2013	6	S	Wadkins, Tim I.	Unassigned
					Issue discussed was that the Gas Contactor C-200 may experience corrosion of the vessel shell opposite the sour gas inlet nozzle which could result in loss of containment and personnel exposure/injury.										
					Consider reviewing the current inspection plans and any metalurgy upgrades C-200.										

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17545	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.10.1.1	14. (Facility Siting checklist question) Issue discussed was "If the building meets minimum occupancy requirements, is it sited more than 50 feet from a process plant or pipeway containing hydrocarbons? If not, has the building had a HAZOP type Risk Assessment completed with the recommendations implemented?" There are two pipeways within 50' of the CACC building. Recommendation: Consider conducting a Risk Assessment of the pipeways adjacent to the Cracking Area Control Center and making recommendation if needed. Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.	Consider conducting a Risk Assessment of the pipeways adjacent to the Cracking Area Control Center and making recommendation if needed.					9/26/2013			Crow, Mark A.	Unassigned

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17546	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.10.2.1	15. (Facility Siting checklist question) Issue discussed was "If occupancy of the building is required for the safe shutdown of an operating plant, is there adequate personnel protective equipment to handle emergencies that could reasonably be expected to occur?" Scott Air Packs are located immediately outside the FCC Control Room. Hydro and LSFO control rooms have breathing air available inside the control rooms for use if building air inlets are closed. Recommendation: Consider installing emergency breathing air capability in the Cracking Control Room. Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.	Consider reviewing the Richmond Refinery requirement for breathing air in control rooms and installing emergency breathing air capability in the Cracking Control Room if necessary. The Cracking Control Room is a shelter in place building, supplied breathing air may or may not be required.					9/26/2013			Crow, Mark A.	Unassigned
17547	Cracking	#3 H2S PLANT/SWC	2012	19.11.1.1	16. Issue discussed was piping specification break review. Consider reviewing the piping specification breaks associated with the following equipment to ensure appropriateness for service. Correct P&IDs as needed. Make corrections in field as needed. Non-Risk Ranked Actionable Item required to meet regulatory/statutory requirements and/or to be consistent with Chevron's guiding principles.	Consider reviewing the piping specification breaks associated with the following equipment to ensure appropriateness for service. Correct P&IDs as needed. Make corrections in field as needed.					9/26/2013			Scaief, Brian R.	Unassigned

Totals: 16 Records